Episode 12 – After the licensing deal…building the HealthSenseTM operating business with Ed Fish

Aug 24, 2022

About this episode

In our discussion with Ed Fish, Vice President and General Manager at Bay State Milling, we hear about some of his experiences and reflections on the post-deal journey and moving from a licensing deal to an operating business. This podcast follows on from our discussion around business accountability and the need for driving technologies to sustainable returns. In the context of tech transfer being built around relationships, exploring the post-transaction experience is important as we think there is some misunderstanding around the investment, time, risk and complexities of bringing technologies through from license to revenue.

Ed provides some terrific examples of how they managed unforeseen challenges and in turn built new forms of value and protection to the licensed technology and the assets they are continuing to build in North America.


CB: Hello, everyone, and welcome to Tech Transfer Talk. My name is Cameron Begley, and I am absolutely delighted to have join me today, from Boston, Massachusetts, Ed Fish from Bay State Milling. Ed Fish, hello and welcome.

EF: Thank you for having me.

CB: Pleasure, Ed, pleasure. And, Ed, our history goes back a very intense six or seven years in some respects, when I was working with Arista Cereal Technologies, and you were my counterparty at Bay State working through the high fibre wheat deal.

EF: Yeah, I think we can trace our history back to 2016, 2017, and it certainly was intense. And it doesn’t feel like it’s been that long, Cameron.

CB: No, it doesn’t. It doesn’t feel too far back. And yet the thing I really am looking forward to talking to you about today Ed is what’s been happening since that inking of the license in 2017. Because I think, like all negotiations, they’re detailed and they’re hard, but it was done in a tremendous spirit. Everyone was just so focused on the prize and the sharing of the opportunity. But today what I’m hoping to explore is ‘and then what happened?’.

EF: It’s a lot.

CB: Yeah, I hope so, Ed. But maybe to start, it’d be good to understand a bit about Bay State Milling. Whilst listeners in North America may know you, I suspect a lot of the world may not know much about Bay State Milling.

EF: Sure. Well, Bay State Milling is headquartered in Quincy, Massachusetts, just outside of Boston. We are a private, over 120-year-old family-owned business. We describe ourselves as being a plant-based ingredients business. The heritage of the company was wheat milling, and over the last decade, we have expanded the business into ancient grains, edible seeds, spices, and now varietal solutions. And we primarily are a B2B business, which is why most people have not heard of us, but our customers are generally large food manufacturers, distribution companies, and some other businesses that are making foods that consumers are buying and consuming. I think the story that we’ll talk about today is a bit about the tech transfer, but then more specifically, what happens after the deal is signed. And it’s been a great learning experience.

CB: Thanks for setting up my segue, mate, that was terrific. Thank you. So how did it strike you, this new universe you moved into of tech transfer as notionally, we came together. I’m sort of inferring ed that the first tech transfer deal you were involved in was the Arista cereal technology deal around the high fibre wheat?

EF: It was, and I think at the time, Cameron, I was very focused on the deal.  And the hypothesis that drove the deal was the end state. So, I had a clear vision of where we were going, and I had a desire to complete the deal and get started. What I didn’t fully appreciate is what needed to happen in order to get to that end state. Buying a business, you’re buying a book of customers, you’re buying infrastructure, you’re buying capabilities, people. In the case of this agreement, this deal between Bay State Milling and Arista, we essentially were handed a bag of seeds,

CB: Pretty much.

EF: And that’s where it all started.

CB: Yeah. Well, to be fair, some fields of wheat as well. But you’re absolutely right. You got a couple of bags of seed, and all the best. Gross simplification, of course. So that sudden shift, if you, like, in focus, and you identifying in that answer you gave there Ed, you recognizing that all of a sudden, you’ve been handed a couple of bags of seed metaphorically, and you’ve got to build these capabilities and build these customers. So, whilst you were focused on getting the deal done and you could see the end game, what sort of things did you then discover unfolded in starting to build these new capabilities, how that value was going to be created, perhaps a little bit about during the negotiation if you like but I’m really interested in post the licensing deal being done.

EF: Yeah. And I think nothing ever goes exactly as you plan in any deal. Tech transfer otherwise. But in this case, where we’re dealing with biology, we’re dealing with plants. It’s particularly true because you can’t control the environment. Towards the end of the deal, we began to make some, and we had a very sophisticated business plan mapped out over many years. And towards the end of the deal, as we got close, and everyone had a high degree of confidence that, while we had some finer points to negotiate, we were most certainly going to complete the deal. We had to make some business decisions about beginning to grow product and that was the first step. And one of the challenges in our industry with this kind of a deal is particularly larger sales. You can’t sell something you don’t have. And so, we needed to begin to grow, and we did that. And I think the supply chain is where the most intense amount of time and focus was spent in the early days how much should we grow? Where should we grow it? How do we create the right redundancies, risk management practices, and in this instance, how do we partner with a key element of this deal was, Bay State Milling is an ingredient company; we are not a breeding company; we are not a genetics business. And so, a lot of the critical knowledge in those early steps resided with the folks that we had agreed on in the deal. So, I think that element of the first sort of step of building the business was actually growing plants. It required us to partner closely with many of the folks around the table who had engaged in the tech transfer. And I think that strengthened the partnership right out of the gates. I think in this instance, we had a very complex agreement involving many different parties and then going out and doing the hard work of building the business forced us to work together. And because I don’t have a ton of experience with tech transfers, I don’t know how it works in other instances. But in this case, the idea that we signed the deal and didn’t just go our own separate ways, we actually signed the deals and even further worked closely together, I think strengthened the partnership and it was critical to building the business in the early days.

EF: One of the unique things about agriculture and food is, this is my personal belief, the technology shouldn’t be static, it’s evolving. And we need to do that because consumer behaviors and needs change, and because we constantly need to be driving efficiency in the business. It’s your classic business case. You need to have your first mover advantage with a more expensive product that isn’t exactly what you want but it’s good enough. And then you need to scale and drive out costs. And as the technology proliferates, you may have more competition, you may invite more competition in, but you’ve already had that first mover advantage and you’ve gotten economies of scale and you’ve driven cost out to a point that you have a competitive advantage. And we can’t do that on our own. In this particular instance, with high amylose wheat, we must rely on our technology partners to improve on the technology. We have to rely on our supply chain partners to improve their agronomics practices, to grow product more efficiently. We need to improve our operations to produce ingredients more efficiently and take products to market more efficiently. So it is a team effort. And many of those pieces are sort of classic business tactics. But at the technology level itself, it has to continuously be invested in, otherwise it won’t succeed.

CB: That’s a really fascinating insight, Ed, and completely agree with your thesis that it can’t be static for all the reasons you just described. I think the other Ag reason that comes to mind is biology is not static. So, biology, the system we perform in, the biology needs to perform in a changing environment, whether that’s different abiotic conditions, how much rain comes and sunshine and things. But also, another world I work in is biosecurity. So how much pest pressure is coming and making sure that it’s resistant to a whole bunch of diseases. So, yeah, I think that’s a great insight that it can’t be static; that captures that notion of a value pool. You’ve got a whole lot of actors putting this product together, this business together. It’s not that while Bay State Milling is the lead actor, almost the conductor of the orchestra, all these other actors not only need to participate in that value pool, but also need to get rewarded for participating in that value pool. And that, of course, is inherently dynamic.

EF: Absolutely. And the other factor, besides biology, that influences this, is markets. In our case, we compete with our customers against the next best alternative. Those alternatives are improving, so we need to improve. There’s endless number of wonderful technologies – innovative, disruptive, groundbreaking technologies, that don’t succeed. And they don’t succeed because of many reasons, but ultimately the market won’t accept it.

CB: The fact that you’re in a contest not only against your competition, but in a contest for consumers’ mouths effectively, not necessarily directly. You noted earlier you’re a B2B business, but you have to know what consumers are thinking in order to meet the needs of your customers. The interesting challenge, I think, with this universe in agriculture and biology, particularly in agriculture, is that it takes more time than the consumer’s movements. You need to be thinking about the product three, four, five years ahead of where the consumer is heading, sort of where the puck is going to be moment. How has that been working for you within, not only with the high fibre wheat, but if you’re going to be VP for Varietal Solutions, your mind has to be five to ten years ahead of where your consumer is.

EF: It’s really challenging, Cameron, for two reasons. One, it’s exactly what you said, the ability to improve the technology. And we have some interesting tools at our disposal now that we didn’t have just a couple of years ago. But it is significantly slower than the speed at which consumer behaviors change, and preferences change. So, I think what we look for is, and consumers who would have anticipated COVID but prior to COVID, I think our thought was what are trends that will stay versus what are trends that will come and go? Kind of more of just a novelty that has a brief moment in the sun. And based on these sorts of fundamental trends, these macro trends, we can back into value propositions that we feel have staying power, and we can differentiate and then capture value or capture market by doing that. The other challenge is mistakes are incredibly costly because of the timeline of breeding. You may find that the path you set yourself on was in fact wrong. And your mistake is not a six-month or twelve-month mistake, or you can equate that to dollars as well. But you find out you just set yourself back three, five, seven years and it’s very difficult. So, we’re looking for those macro trends and then we’re looking to take advantage of technologies or practices that allow us to align with them in the present or in the near future. So, we tend to stay away from areas where we don’t have a huge amount of conviction that they will be driving forces over the next decade.

CB: Any investment needs conviction in this space.

EF: Correct.

CB: I think not only do you need the market data, the numbers to support it, there needs to be an emotional conviction that comes with it to stay the course.

EF: Oh, absolutely. And for example, what we’re doing with high end millers’ wheat, the numbers are the easy part. They’re very compelling. The conviction is what is tested because you’re building something that doesn’t exist and you’re selling something, you’re creating a market. And the switching costs for customers very high. And you’re convincing folks, well, first of all, you’re creating awareness. If it doesn’t exist, you have to create the awareness, and then you have to create the demand and execute on your sales. And so, you need to convey that conviction externally as well as sort of internally for the investment case. But it’s the same thing externally, because if you don’t believe it, others won’t.

CB: Yeah, you need to bring a lot of people along the journey and maintaining that conviction. Before going on to explore that notion of building the market, I want to come back to something that you said a couple of seconds ago, there Ed, around mistakes are costly, and they are. Not everything goes according to the plan. I think that’s not a shock to anyone doing tech transfer. The question I’ve got, maybe for you personally but maybe as BSM, is how good are you at stopping things? Saying ‘no’ at the beginning is probably a little bit easier, but how good are you at stopping things when you suddenly find that you’re not where you need to be? And the course back to where you need to be is looking a bit hairy.

EF: Yeah, I think it’s I can’t answer you by saying how good we are either in an absolute or relative basis, but I can speak a little bit to that. I think it’s an increase in general. It’s a very important principle in business and in life when to say ‘no’ or when to stop. At base date, we often use some of these business cliches: fail fast, experiment, fail fast; or if your experiment works, accelerate. We use this box: one, two, three frameworks.  One of the boxes is around cutting. And so, I think it’s human nature to want to do more and more and more, and it’s also human nature not to let go because you hold on to hope. And so, I would just say, and humans are irrational, so, I would say, within the business context, we try to be as rational and disciplined as we possibly can about decisions as opposed to relying on hope. The other critical piece, I think is learning, is when you do fail or when you do stop or pivot, that you make sure that you reflect on the learning, and you try and capture that so you don’t find yourself making that same mistake.

CB: Yeah, I think something that we’ve started to talk about, at least amongst our sort of network, is not so much fail fast, but learn fast. Because if you’re learning fast, you’ll make that decision with a better basis. Failing fast is great, but if you’re not learning anything from it, then you’re just going to keep failing fast.

EF: One of the things about learning fast versus failing fast, is when you’re doing too many things you can’t learn. And I think that the principle that applies both to failing fast and to learning fast is to be disproportionately, focusing your attention or resources on the most important things.

CB: Yeah, that’s a good insight.

EF: For us, for example, in breeding, it’s very easy to pursue many, many pathways and to find out that the results are quite diluted. And so that’s an example of a discipline where and we’ve learned to be very focused on the most important objectives and then to apply the resources there, as opposed to the world being your oyster and trying to get to too many different places simultaneously.

CB: So, it sounds not so much an 80:20 rule, more like a 95:5 rule.

EF: Yeah, and it’s hard to do. I think it’s constantly I’m not going to say pivot, but you’re constantly recalibrating, figuring out what to stop because it’s distracting.

CB: Yeah, that’s a terrific insight because I think it is hard to learn if you’re overwhelmed with too much data or too much opportunity or too many deals happening or too many relationships to manage. You can get quite overwhelmed by that. I’m interested to explore the bumps. Are you able to share with us an example of how the plan, how it deviated and how you corrected course? Yeah, that’d be really interesting.

EF: So, I’ll give you a favourable example. Don’t want to make ourselves too vulnerable on this show. Here’s a great example. Wheat is one of the largest commodities in the world. It has been the backbone of Western civilization in some ways. And all of the advancements in wheat have been focused primarily on agronomics. This deal was focused on nutritional density. And we knew a challenge would be, we did not make this investment to capture 1% of the market. We were going after a big number, and so we knew a challenge would be ‘well, how do you do this at scale?’ We have a very large wheat system that’s designed for efficiency, not specialization.

EF: So, if we think very specifically about the supply chain, that means no IP. There are different classes and varieties of wheat that are segregated, but no IP around a nutritional attribute. In this case, fibre. And we knew that would be a challenge. But as we built that, and we went out and grew the crop, and began building the IP supply chain, we realized one of the elements that needed to be solved for is testing. There were tests available, but nothing that could be done remotely and nothing that could be done rapidly. And so how do you determine whether wheat in a field is in fact, what you think it is, or when it arrives at a grain elevator, whether it is what the farmer said it is, and then once it moves from the elevator to the mill, what it is. And so, in all these different spots in the supply chain, you need a fast and accurate way to say, yes, that’s high amyloid wheat. No, it’s not. And so that was a snag we didn’t anticipate at first. We went down the path of beginning to problem solve utilizing existing testing methodologies. What is the best test out there? What’s the fastest? What’s the cheapest? And very quickly, it became an operational bottleneck. We couldn’t run enough tests fast enough, cheap enough.

EF: And it took us a while to just break that mental model and say, no, we have to develop our own. And that’s what we went out and did. And we now have a very low cost, very accurate, very fast way to test for high amylose wheat and on to develop other methods and other tests in different spots in the supply chain. But that’s an example. And that kind of work, developing your own method is not something you do overnight. And so, I think it’s a perfect example of as we were scaling, we realized we had a problem. And there wasn’t a solution that existed. And so having this sort of hit pause to develop the solution on our own was an example of the plan deviating and, in my mind, creating further value. But it was never something we had foreseen, and it was certainly a challenge that was difficult to overcome.

CB: That is such a terrific example, Ed. That is such a terrific example. Thank you for sharing that. The need to maintain the integrity and understand the quality of a product at any point in the value chain, not something that is normally front of mind, I think, for the inventors, but a really interesting example, in a closed loop identity preserve system. So, yeah, that’s a really terrific example.

EF: If I may add, Cameron. I think one of the other elements of that that’s interesting and I don’t believe it’s uncommon, is we were the receiver of the technology. And what we’ve done since is built technology around the technology. And I don’t think that’s uncommon. I also think it relates to the earlier discussion around classic business models, right. Where what we’ve done by building technology around the technology that we’ve licensed in is, I said, creating value. But the other way you can think about it is digging a moat. Further entrenching our position. And so, when the market opens up, or if we choose to invite others into the market, we have a very defensible position. And I think it’s just good business practice.

CB: Absolutely, as you say, building more defence as much as you’re building opportunity and effectively offence, is the perfect analogy to run there. And I think that, again, in the world of tech transfer, it’s the handoff point. And I think it gets lost at that moment just how much investment and just how much is yet to take place, for the licensee to start to generate value, returns on their investments. It’s really easy to think that wow, we did all this research. It’s not to diminish that effort, but it’s also to recognize there’s still a lot more that has to happen from this point, from the licensee and its partners, as well as the degree to which the licensor chooses to stay involved.

EF: Yeah. And I think it’s always a tension in a licensing agreement, where those who develop the technology expect to be recoup their investment immediately. And those who license in the technology say, ‘wait a minute, I’m investing a lot of money not just to license it, but then to go out and build a product, to build a product line, to build a business around the technology’. And that’s just healthy business tension that needs to be navigated. I think in some cases, the of those who license in the technology sometimes often end up investing more than those who created the technology, in a shorter amount of time. But it’s on the back end of all the research that’s already been done. And so, this timing element creates tension.

CB: But I think the really key issue in that moment, is around trust. And that’s the trust in the negotiation.  I’m delighted to say we had lashings of it in what we were working through. It was a very complex deal, and I think there was a lot of trust in the room. But if there’s not a trust about the relationship that’s about to unfold because you’re entering into a 15 to 20-year relationship, it’s not a transaction in the sense that you’re going to buy four gallons of milk or something and walk off into the sunset. This is a relationship we’re forming. It’s akin to a marriage in a lot of respects. And that relationship has to be built on trust. And there’s going to be a lot of give and take through that.

EF: It has to be built on trust. And by nature of the agreement, these tech transfer agreements, it’s asymmetric in expertise. And those who develop the technology, who believe it, is an incredible innovation, don’t necessarily have the capabilities to bring it to market. And those who are expected to bring it to market when they say ‘it’s going to take more time’, or ‘we can’t sell it at X value’, it’s a hard pill to swallow. But they are the ones who have the expertise to take it to market, just like they’re the ones who don’t have the technical expertise to develop the technology on their own. So, I think that also yes, it’s a marriage. Yes, there has to be a lot of trust. Yes, it’s a long-term element, but this kind of asymmetric expertise, it makes it interesting because each party is sort of constantly evaluating the performance of the other. Is the technology what you said? Is it good enough? Are you selling it fast? Are you growing the business quick enough? And you need to trust that the other party is making an honest effort to do their best.

CB: It really sounds Ed, that the journey post-licensing deal, the integration of the opportunity into BSM has really been going strongly, not necessarily fast, but it’s been building a momentum over the last few years. You touched earlier about, a little bit holding on to hope and the conviction within the organization, how has BSM managed that internal discourse, managing the board and keeping the executive team on top of the inevitable ups and downs of the last four years or so?

EF: Yeah, I think it’s a great question. I would say different stakeholders have different incentives and interests at the board level. They certainly are interested in us delivering the return on investment as promised. In this case, it is also about delivering a capability set that enables the corporate strategy around more specialization, and I think among the executive leadership team and then down throughout the organization. And really the credit belongs to our CEO, Pete Levangie, who Cameron, you know very well and was intimately involved in the negotiations. I think it’s important context, maybe before I answer this question, that the listeners understand that Bay State is not a technology company and that this is quite different for us. This is about highly differentiated specialty ingredients for the mass market, but it’s about process supply chains that are unique, processing that’s unique, selling that’s unique. And so back to your question. And the credit belongs to Pete. We didn’t just seal the deal and then ask everyone within Bay State to apply 100% of their focus to this new technology. We allowed a small number of people to work on it. And each year, more people began to work on it. And each year we invested more resources. And so, I would say it is a discourse. And the way we avoided discourse was we paced it. We started small and we started slow. And as you mentioned, we have now gained a lot of momentum. There is a bit of a ground swell, and now things are really at a place where we can draw in our colleagues and engage more people in focusing on building what we’ve branded as HealthSense®, and making it a priority for a larger number of people. So, if that makes sense, I think that was really important and smart. If I had it my way, I probably would have had more people focus on this a lot sooner and invested a lot of dollars much quicker. But at the wisdom of Pete and others among the executive leadership team, we paced it nicely and we kind of brought others into the fold slowly over time.

CB: That’s a terrific description. And Ed, it sounds a little like you’ve earned the right to build the resource over a period of time. That you brought something that is completely different to the board and said, we need you to invest in this to start to develop up this new specialty’s business. I don’t know whether it was the first, Ed, but here’s a significant opportunity. And it sounds like you’ve earned the right to build through each period of time, every six months, annually, whatever it is.

EF: With time, we’ve validated the market opportunity, we’ve validated the technology, and that’s allowed us to invest in assets and capabilities, invest behind this in a way that’s helping us now really accelerate the business.

CB: And that’s why that internal discourse is really interesting. It’s easy to look at an opportunity and evaluate the market and make your projections and do that quantitative work. But bringing an organization along to execute on delivering to that market is, I think, a different part of the puzzle, which perhaps gets a little bit overlooked at times. Because if the cultural setting of the organization is not there for risk and tech transfer and things inevitably going off course, can the organization hold its head in the game while you’re ironing out these problems and things aren’t quite working to the plan?

EF: I’m glad you brought up the idea of culture. You need leadership and culture that will allow an organization to evolve. And how you pace it and how you structure it’s going to be different for everyone, I think, at Bay State, and I believe that part of the reason Bay State was selected as a partner for Arista, is while our heritage was wheat milling, within the wheat milling space, our focus has always been differentiation and specialization. Now, wheat milling is not a value-added specialty ingredient. It is wheat flowers, generally thought of as a commodity product. But within that space, we were overweight, kind of always being different, not being the biggest and cheapest. And I think that kind of mindset and that sort of culture helped us. It wasn’t all easy or fluid, but it made it easier to sort of say, hey, we’re going to try something different. We’re going to invest in something different, we’re going to build something. It’s going to be hard, it’s going to take time, but it’s going to succeed, and it’s going to be the pathway towards the next generation for our company.

CB: What I find interesting there, Ed, is there was already an internal appetite to be differentiated and to be doing specialties. Then it’s bolting on in licensing and tech transfer. This whole new universe of reaching beyond your own walls, reaching out through the door and finding the best that might be available externally. How has that culture, if you like, of tech transfer, taken root within BSM over the last few years?

EF: I would say two things. First of all, I think one of the smart elements of the deal for us was to the extent we could control how much new we were taking on, we did. What we didn’t do is license in a unique variety that also required new technology and processing capability and several other elements. We know we stuck to what we were good at. And so, in theory, we were taking technology that we could plug into our existing infrastructure. We talked a little bit about how unique the supply chain and processing go-to-market is. And so, we did have to change things around how we manage supply chains, how we process ingredients, how we take them to market. But they were tweaks and as opposed to saying we’re going to license the technology and then we’re going to go build entirely new plants. And so, I think that was helpful. And then what we did was, I wouldn’t say we were off to the races in building tech transfer capabilities, we were off to the races in building the business. And in building the business we identified and then built capabilities which have furthered our appetite for, knowledge of, and capabilities, with regards to tech transfer. But I would say it’s more broadly, sort of looking for new, exciting, plant-based ingredient opportunities that we can either license in, that we can acquire, that we can partner on, some sort of kind of, gain privileged access to, and then plug it into our system in terms of ,yes, we know how to scale up IP supply chains, we know how to process those ingredients, and we know how to take them to market. So, through this journey, which is still early in its life cycle, we are much further along in terms of our, I would say specifically, kind of technical capabilities and then our business savvy around IP.

CB: And I’d venture to suggest, Ed, that the other learning from that journey is that you now know what lay ahead on the next deal.

EF: We think we know what lay ahead, but my sense is no one ever knows.

CB: No, you don’t know. But perhaps with the experiences you now have as an organization, more ready for the things that might pop up and have a deeper sense of the things that are more likely to pop up.

EF: Absolutely. It’s not just this capability around developing and acquiring technology ourselves and defending it or enhancing it ourselves, and commercializing it, certainly. But it’s the business capability, I think, is what you’re speaking of Cameron, kind of. And that’s just simply practising. We’re not practising. This is real life. It’s serious business, but it’s the concept of the more reps you get, the better you become. And this journey has no doubt made us more ready for the next, and I don’t know how else you would do it. You can read books, but the real learning happens in the hard work of commercializing technology.

CB: It has been terrific talking with you today, Ed. I’d just like your final thoughts around the journey you’ve been on over the last four years, or indeed, even more from our perspective. Is there any final thought or insight you’d like to share with the listeners about what you’ve seen and experienced through the high fibre wheat journey?

EF: Yeah, I’d say three things, Cameron. The first is, and I’m glad our conversation led us to learning, because it’s been a tremendous learning experience for me personally and our organization, for the better. Had I known everything I know today, and the organization had known everything, we absolutely would have done some things different, but we would have done many things the same way. And we don’t have any regrets. We’re incredibly excited about what lies ahead for high amylose wheat. We think we’re still in the early quarters, although I’m sure our technology partners think we’re very late in the game. So, we’re very bullish and excited about the future. We think it truly is an opportunity to disrupt the global wheat supply chain. And if we’re any good at our job, when people think about wheat flour, they should be thinking about HealthSense®. There truly shouldn’t be anything else. So, the learning has been tremendous. That doesn’t mean we would have done everything differently. And I would say, for your listeners that we often, I guess, to steal a quote from Bill Gates, we overestimate what we can accomplish in five years and underestimate what we can accomplish in ten. And that’s where I think we are. We are in the hard work of closing in on year five and incredibly excited about the next five years ahead.

CB: That’s been terrific. Thanks, Ed. We’ll look forward staying in touch. Thanks again for your time.

EF: Thank you, Cameron.

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